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JURISDICTION IN BANKRUPTCY
WILLrAm E. MUSSMAN* AND STFAN A. RIESENFELDt
I
GENERAL FEATURES OF JURISDICTION IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Judicial Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy as Distinguished from
Legislative Jurisdiction
The following study was undertaken for the purpose of describing the judicial
business which is imposed upon the lower federal courts in the administration of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as revised by the Chandler Act of 1938.1 Our concern here
is with the problems centering around judicial as distinguished from legislative juris-
diction,2 the latter dealing only with the powers of Congress under the bankruptcy
clause of the Constitution.3  The history of bankruptcy in the United States4 has
been summarized by Justice Cardozo as that of "an expanding concept that has had
to fight its way."'  Congressional legislation has taken the path of "progressive
liberalization." While, in the words of the Supreme Court, the subject of bank-
ruptcy is incapable of final definition,' it may be stated generally that it covers the
liquidation or rehabilitation of embarrassed estates! At any rate, this is the scope
of bankruptcy under the present act.
B. The Nature of Federal Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy in General
Federal jurisdiction9 in bankruptcy covers the whole business of the federal courts
in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act. It encompasses all their activities in
connection with "straight" bankruptcy proceedings,1" railroad and corporate re-
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
f Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
152 STAT. 883 (1938), it U. S. C. §I If. (1940). We shall hereafter simply refer to the section
numbers of the Act.
2 For a discussion of the two concepts, see REsT4,TEENxT, CONFLICT OF Laws §§59-73 (1934).
'U. S. CONsr. Art 1, §8, cl. 4.
"See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HisTORY (1935); Riesenfeld, The Evohion
of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. Rrv. 401 (1947).
'Cardozo, J., dissenting in Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U. S. 513, 535 (1936).
'See Adair v. Bank of America Ass'n, 303 U. S. 350, 354 (1938).
'See Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502, 513 (1938).
' For a valiant attempt at a functional definition of bankruptcy see Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy,
89 U. PA. L. RFv. 1 (1940).
'Jurisdiction in this sense relates to the power of the federal courts to properly assume the determi-
nation of a case. It is, of course, recognized that "jurisdiction to decide is jurisdiction to make a wrong
as well as a right decision" (Pope v. United States, 323 U. S. I, 14 (1944)), and that this power to
err applies within certain limits even to the jurisdiction itself. Jurisdiction is unfortunately, as Justice
Reed has emphasized, "a word of uncertain meaning" (Driscoll v. Edison Co., 307 U. S. 104, I10
(x939)), and "competes with 'right' as one of the most deceptive legal pitfalls." Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting in Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 685, 695 (1944).
" Bankruptcy Act, §S1-72.
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organizations," arrangements,"2 and the rehabilitation of farmers,'" of wage
earners, 14 and of embarrassed estates belonging to special classesP5
While the simplest solution would have been to attribute the jurisdiction to
adjudicate all litigations arising in connection with an estate in liquidation or
rehabilitation to that federal court in which the main proceeding is pending, this
course has not been pursued. As in the whole field of federal jurisdiction, Congress
has here been faced with the delicate task of distributing the jurisdiction to decide
the various types of litigation which might arise under the Bankruptcy Act between
the state and the federal courts-a task which frequently requires a compromise
between political expediency and procedural efficiency. 6 Furthermore, Congress
has had to decide not only which of the various federal courts is the most appropri-
ate to take jurisdiction over the principal petition in a particular case' 7 but also
whether there should be a further allocation of the total business connected with one
main proceeding among the various courts upon territorial principles. Certainly,
because of the nationwide scope of the effect of the main proceedings, an attribution
of all controversies arising therefrom to the court where they are pending would in
some instances impose an undue burden on the parties affected. Two questions
immediately arise in this connection: (i) What Congress can constitutionally do,
and (2) what it has actually done.
The first question can be disposed of briefly. The scope of the bankruptcy clause
in conjunction with the judiciary article of the Constitution would have permitted
Congress to reserve the entire administration of the Bankruptcy Act to the federal
courts' 8 and to extend the territorial jurisdiction of tbe court in which the main
proceeding pends throughout the United States. 9 But determining the extent to
which Congress has exercised, this power is a problem -of statutory construction
requiring separate investigation for each of the various proceedings under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The solution is beset with doubts and difficulties despite the attempted
"I d., H§77, xo0--*76.
'21d., §§3o1-399.
" Id., §75. This section has expired. See note 220, isfra.
"
4 1d., §§6oi-686.
"Id., §§8s (local taxing agencies), 401-526 (real property arrangements), 701-703 (Maritime
Commission liens).
"o Justice Frankfurter, in his article, Distribution of Jndicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORN. L. Q. 499 (1928), concludes that legislation distributing the judicial business to
secure a fair balance between state and federal court is particularly subject to the shifting needs of
time and circumstance, occasioned primarily by the interplay of industrial and financial forces on
social habit and political sentiment.
" See .Bankruptcy Act, §§2(), 77(a), 128, 322, 622. These provisions apparently concern "venue"
rather than "jurisdiction" in the technical sense. On this distinction in general see Industrial Ass'n v.
C. I. Rt., 323 U. S. 310, 313 (i945); 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §2.13 f. ( 4 th ed., Moore-Mulder, 1940).
'
8 Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426, 430 (924); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U. S.
367, 374 (1934); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433, 439 (1940).
"Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300 (U. S. 1838); United States v. Union Pac. k. R., 98 U. S. 569,
604 (1878); Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 683 (935); Mississippi Pub. Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438, 442 (1946).
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"scientific draftsmanship" of the great revision of 1938.20 Jurisdiction in bankruptcy
can by no means be characterized as a uniform type of exercise of the judicial power;
rather, it is a mixtum compositum consisting of various categories and having sev-
eral aspects. It is desirable that these aspects and categories be considered before we
discuss the jurisdiction connected with the several "proceedings under this Act."'"
C. General Characterization of Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy
An analysis of the federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy leads necessarily to the con-
dusion that it has all the general features of ordinary federal jurisdiction but pos-
sesses, at least in part, special characteristics.
i. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy as limited jurisdiction
As in all other matters,22 the federal courts sitting in bankruptcy, though having
very broad and far-reaching powers, are courts of limited jurisdiction.23 Their juris-
diction exists only to the extent that it is granted in the Bankruptcy Act and the
Federal Judicial Code. One of the most important consequences of this characteri-
zation relates to the problem of res judicata, both of adjudications by the federal
courts sitting in bankruptcy matters vis-a-vis state courts or federal courts sitting in
non-bankruptcy matters or in proceedings under the Act but of a different type, and
the adjudications of these courts vis-a-vis the bankruptcy court. No uniform rule
applies to these various situations, however, and the answer depends both on the
type of question adjudicated and a variety of other factors which will presently
appear.F'
2. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy as jurisdiction at law or in equity
The federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy, in the broad sense used here (com-
prising all proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act as well as all controversies arising
out of such proceedings), is either at law or in equity according to the circumstances
of the case and the relief prayed2 Although the coalescence of law and equity
under the new federal rules2 has substantially decreased the significance of the
o Although the bankruptcy reform of 1938 was at first hailed as a masterpkcc of draftsmanship
and scientific lawmaking, the imperfections that are inherent in all human endeavor have become more
and more apparent. Compare, for example, McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the
Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. oF CH. L. REa. 369 (1937), or The Chandler Bankruptcy Amendatory Bill Is
Enacted [a symposium], 12 J. N. A. REF. BANXR. 124 (1938), with Mulder, Ambiguities in the Chandler
Act, 89 U. PA. L. Ray. io (1940).
" See notes 9-15, supra.
"
2McCormick v. Sullivant, so Wheat. 192 (U. S. 1825); DOME, FFnr.RAL PRocEDua 25-6 (1928).
" Chicot County Dist. v. Baxter Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 377 (1940); Duggan v. Sansberry, 327 U. 4S
499, .5o 0946). The statement that "The Bankruptcy Court is one of general jurisdiction" in Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 172 n. 14 (938), is undoubtedly a lapsns linguae of Justice Reed.
2 See the discussion infra of the following cases: Gratiot State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U. S. 246
(i9'g); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (5938); Chicot County Dist. v. Baxter Bank, 308 U. S. 371
(194o); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 3o8 U. S. 433 (1940); Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U. S. x61 (1946); Heiser v.
Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726 0946); Gardner v. New Jersey, 67 Sup. Ct. 467 (1947); Feiring v. Gano, x14
Colo. 567, z68 Pac. 2d 9o (1946).
5 See Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U. S. 92, 95 (1932).
" See i MooRE's FEDRAL PIACrMcE S§I.oa, 2.02-2.04 (1938).
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differentiation in most instances, the characterization of the bankruptcy courts as
being primarily courts of equity has had important and extensive legal consequences.
It has been an effective instrument in the hands of the Supreme Court in its en-
deavor to give the federal courts vast powers in the administration of embarrassed
estates and to erect upon the rigid foundation of the Bankruptcy Act a superstructure
of flexibility and adaptability enabling judicial cure both of defects in draftsmanship
of the Act27 and hardships or unfair results flowing from a literal application
8
3. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy as being partly in rem, partly quasi in rem and partly
in personam
The jurisdiction exercised by the federal court in the administration of the Bank-
ruptcy Act has been characterized in some instances as in rem and in others as
quasi in rem, while in still other cases there has never been a doubt that the particu-
lar suit by or against the trustee was strictly in personam.
The adjudication in bankruptcy which establishes the status of the debtor as a
bankrupt is effective and conclusive erga omnes.2 The same holds true in respect
to the approval of the petition in reorganization proceedings0 But the "collateral
estoppel effect" of these decrees is limited. Thus, the facts upon which the decree
is based are not conclusive except as between the parties to the proceeding 3 l For
example, the adjudication based upon a preferential transfer does not establish the
preferential nature of the transaction against the transferee."2 And this applies to all
elements, including the insolvency33 However, if a particular creditor, for instance,
were to object to the confirmation of an arrangement under Section 366(4), he would
be bound by the findings of the court on the issues raised before and passed upon
by the court3 4 The adjudication or final approval of the reorganization petition
' In Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. U. S. Realty Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940), the court invoked
its equity power as a basis for holding that petitioner should have reorganized under Chapter X instead
of Chapter XI in order that a great number of unsecured interests might have adequate protection,
although the Act itself was silent on the point.
"IThis "inherent equitable power" has heen invoked for this purpose in an ever-increasing variety
of situations. Thus, see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939) (disallowance of a claim either as
secured or general); American Surety Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U. S. 269 (1946) (subordination of one
general claim to another general claim); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726 (1946) (power to go behind
a claim for purposes of investigating for fraud, limited only by principles of res judicata); Vanston
Bondholders Protective Com. v. Green, 67 Sup. Ct. 237 (1947) (disallowance of a contractual claim
despite its validity under state law).
" Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398, 428 (U. S. 1874); New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass &
Copper Co., 91 U. S. 656, 661 (1875); Manson v. Williams, 213 U. S. 453, 455 (79o9); Gratiot State
Bank v. Johnson, 249 U. S. 246, 248 (7979); Meyers v. International Co., 263 U. S. 64, 73 (1923).
"Bankruptcy Act, §I49; 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §6.13 (1 4 th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1947).
"
1 Manson v. Williams, 213 U. S. 453 (i909); Gratiot State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U. S. 246 (1919).
In an involuntary petition only the petitioning creditors are parties. While other creditors may inter-
vene, they can appear only in favor of the petition. Bankruptcy Act, 559 (f). On the other hand, in
reorganization proceedings the creditors may appear against the petition. Bankruptcy Act, §§137, 144.
5 2 Gratiot State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U. S. 246 (199).
9'lbid.; Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426, 429-430 (1924); Liberty Nat. Bank
v. Bear, 265 U. S. 365, 370 (1924).
a Cf. Friend v. Talcott, 228 U. S. 27, 41 (1913); Myers v. International Co., 263 U. S. 64 (1923).
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prevents collateral attack in any other court35 Orders of general application by the
court, such as those granting discharges and confirming reorganization or arrange-
ment plans, bind all parties to whom the decree purports to apply even though the
court assumed jurisdiction over the subject matter erroneously by misconstruing the
provisions of the statute'0 or by failing to appreciate its unconstitutionality. 7
The jurisdiction of the court attaches from the filing of the petition and extends
to all property in the actual or constructive possession of the bankrupt, thereby
placing it in custodia legis. The filing of the petition is "a caveat to all the world""8
except in so far as the Bankruptcy Act specifically protects persons dealing with the
debtor39
Special consideration must be given to the nature of the jurisdiction of the court
in allowing or disallowing claims against the estate. The Supreme Court has recently
emphasized that such adjudications are not of actions in personam but of claims
against assets only.40 This position can conceivably have important consequences
with respect to the res judicata effects of such allowance or disallowance. Adjudica-
tions of "claims with respect to assets" are commonly called quasi in rem and have
not the usual effect of giving rise to an action in debt or estoppel by verdict. 1
For straight bankruptcy proceedings, it could consequently be argued with plausi-
bility that the allowance or disallowance of a claim by the referee for the reason that
he considers it as proved or not proved is not res judicata in a later suit by the credi-
tor against the bankrupt!' It could hardly be contended that privity exists between
"This is expressly provided for by §149. The section is construed in Duggan v. Sansberry, 327
U. S. 499 (1946) (holding that the bankruptcy court whose proceedings are stayed under §513 may not
question even a preliminary ex pade approval).
"
8 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938), noted in 23 MINN. L, REv. 673 (1939).
'
5 Chicot County Dist. v. Baxter Bank, 3o8 U. S. 371 (1940).
"SMueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 14 (1902); May v. Henderson, 268 U. S. ill, 117 (z925); Gross
v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342, 344 (1933).
" The principal provisions protecting persons dealing with the bankrupt are § §70(d) and 21 (g). For
details see 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§70.66-.68 (4th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1942) and 2 COLLIER, BANK-
RU.PTCY §2.30 (1 4 th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1940).
40Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U. S. 161, 170 (1946); Gardner v. New Jersey, 67 Sup. Ct. 467 (1947).
However, Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinions in both of these cases, called the proof and allowance
of claims in a receivership case "strictly a proceeding in personam" in Morris v. Jones, 67 Sup. Ct. 451,
455 (1947). These views are hardly consistent.
41REsTATENIENT, JUDGMENTS §§32, 76(2) (1942).
"The contrary position is maintained by 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §57.A4 (x4 th ed., Moore-Oglebay,
1941) and 2 REmiNGToN, BANKRUPTCY §1003 (4 th ed. 1940). However, only a few of the cases cited
by the authors in favor of their view have actual holdings to that effect. For examples of those which do
so hold, see Elmore-Q. & Co. v. Henderson-M. Mere. Co., 179 Ala. 548, 6o So. 820 (1913) (allowance
held res judicata in later suit against bankrupt, precluding defense of ultra vires); Blanks v. West Point
Who. Gro. Co., 225 Ala. 74, 142 So. 49 (1932) (allowance held res judicata as to existence of claim in
later suit); Hargadine-M'Kittrick Co. v. Hudson, 122 Fed. 232 (C. C. A. 8th 1903) (disallowance be-
cause of statute of limitations bars later suit in state court); National Surety Co. v. Jean, 36 F. 2d 468
(C. C. A. 6th 1929) (disallowance held binding on surety of creditor on attachment bond).
I It should be observed, however, that the Supreme Court has not committed itself on the question.
Lesser v. Gray, 236 U. S. 70 (915), which is frequently cited in this connection, held merely that a
claim which was disallowed, though erroneously, was discharged if otherwise dischargeable and is
therefore no basis for a recovery. 4ccord with the view in the text, semble, In re McChesney, 58
F.2d 340 (S. D. Cal. 193). Even the cases which intimate that a disallowance might be invoked by
the bankrupt are careful to point out that the disallowance must be based on the invalidity of the claim
and not on other grounds.
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the trustee and the bankrupt in respect to the latter's exempt or post-bankruptcy
assets 43 (although the situation is different in arrangements and reorganizations
where the debtor upon termination reacquires his assets). The bankrupt is not a
"party" to the proceedings relating to the proof and allowance of claims unless he was
actually permitted to object.4 4 It must be noted, of course, that, with the exception of
suits against the bankrupt for the sole purpose of charging sureties on bonds given
to obtain the release of attached or garnished property or for the purpose of per-
fecting attachments or garnishments of property not covering the whole amount of
the claim, the problem can normally arise only where the creditor sues upon a claim
which is either provable but not dischargeable or where the discharge has been with-
held. Oihervise the discharge would preclude a recovery, regardless of the allow-
ance or disallowance by the referee 3 As between the trustee and the creditor the
issues which determine the allowance or disallowance should be res judicata, e.g., the
preferential character of a transfer.40
Of course, actions by the trustee, such as suits for the recovery of preferences,
are clearly in personam.
4. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy as being partly exclusive and paramount and partly con-
current
Jurisdiction in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act is in some aspects con-
current with and in other aspects exclusive of that of the state courts. The general
rule is that federal jurisdiction is concurrent unless a specific statute or the Federal
Judicial Code has made it exclusive under a power which is within the legislative
jurisdiction of Congress4 But even where the jurisdiction over the subject matter
is clearly within the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state courts, a "rule
of comity" has been developed by the Supreme Court to the effect that in proceedings
involving the administration of assets which place the assets in custodia legis the
jurisdiction of the court which attaches first may not be disturbed-thus making such
"A judgment in personam obtained by a creditor against the bankrupt before the filing of the
petition is, of course, res judicata against the trustee. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726 (1946). A
judgment obtained by a creditor against the bankrupt after the filing of the petition has been considered
as not binding on the trustee, I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §1I.09, p. 1172 (1 4 th ed., Moore-Mulder, 1940);
however, a judgment rendered after the filing of the petition in a suit begun by the bankrupt before
that date concludes the trustee even if he has not intervened. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U. S. 161, 166 n. 8
(1946).
"Whether the bankrupt has a right to object to the allowance of the claim depends on various
factors. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, §57.17 ( 4 th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1941); 2 REmiNGTOx, BANK-
RUPTCY §1o25 (4 th ed. 1940). But if the disallowance or allowance were res judicata, there certainly
should be such a right in the case of non-dischargeable debts or where the discharge may be withheld.
"Lesser v. Gray, 236 U. S. 70 (1915).
"Ullman v. Coppard, 246 Fed. 124 (C. C. A. 5 th 1917); Lincoln v. People's Nat'l Bank, 26o Fed.
422 (E. D. Mich. i91g); Metz v. Knobel, 21 F.2d 317 (C. C. A. 2d 1927); Schwartz v. Levine & Malin,
III F.2d 81 (C. C. A. 2d 1940); Feiring v. Gano, 114 Colo. 567, i68 P.2d 9Ol (1946). Whether
the conclusive effect extends to the issue of value is in dispute. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §60.59
(14 th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1941). By the same token, a turn-over order against the bankrupt establishes
conclusively his duty to surrender which can be enforced in a state court. Sampsell'v. Gittelman, 55
Cal. App. 2d 2o8 (1942); Fisher v. Medwedeff, 184 Md. 167, 40 At. 2d 360 (1944).
"DoBiE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 39 (1928).
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jurisdiction "exclusive" 8 Interference is deemed to exist, however, only when
jurisdiction is exercised directly over the assets and not when mere in personam or
otherwise non-conflicting action is taken 9 Conversely, the jurisdiction over the
assets draws to the court the "exclusive" power to adjudicate all controversies re-
lating to the protection, collection, and distribution of such assets . 0 The courts
possess the necessary powers to issue all orders and writs protecting their juris-
diction."1
In like manner the federal courts, in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act,
acquire upon the filing of the petition either in bankruptcy, reorganization, or
arrangement proceedings exclusive jurisdiction over all the property in the actual
or constructive possession of the debtor.Y2  This is recognized for straight bank-
ruptcy by the Federal Judicial Codess for reorganization and arrangement by the
Bankruptcy Act itself. 4 The bankruptcy court, like the federal court under gen-
eral equity principles, has the power to determine all controversies relating to such
assets and to protect its jurisdiction by the necessary writs,sl the Judicial Code
specifically authorizing injunctions against proceedings in state courts.56
But the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts in the administration of the
Bankruptcy Act goes even farther than that based on the comity concept regulating
the conflict between courts of otherwise concurrent jurisdiction. Pursuant to its
legislative powers under the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution, Congress has,
by specific provisions in the Bankruptcy Act which vary for different types of pro-
ceedings, authorized the federal courts to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction
which they otherwise would have under comity principles. In this respect bank-
"' Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St. El. R. R., X77 U. S. 51, 6x (xgoo); Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U. S. 226, 231 (1922); Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 43 (1928); Penn Co. v. Pennsylvania,
294 U. S. x8g, 195 (1935); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 183 (1935); Gordon v. Washington,
295 U. S. 30, 35 (1935); United States v. Klein, 303 U. S. 276, 281 (1938); Princess Lida v. Thompson,
305 U. S. 456, 466 (1939); Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. CO., 314 U. S. 118, 135 (1941); Fischer Y.
American United Ins. CO., 314 U. S. 549, 554 (1942). See Warren, Federal and State Court Inter-
ference, 43 HAv. L. Rav. 345, 359 (s93o)-
"'Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 223 (1929); Commonwealth Co. v. Bradford, 297 U. S.
613, 619 (1936); United States v. Klein, 303 U. S. 276, 281 (1938); Fischer v. American United
Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 549, 554 (1942).
"*Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake Street El. R.R., 177 U. S. 5s, 61 (19oo); Riehle v. Margolies,
279 U. S. 218, 223 (1929) and cases cited; Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456, 466 (1939). In
receivership cases this jurisdiction over controversies resulting from the "attractive force" of the main pro-
ceeding (see Risenfeld, Evolutiax of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. Rav. 401, 410 fi. (1947)) has
been called "ancillary jurisdiction." See Wabash R. R. v. Adelburt College, 208 U. S. 38, 54 (908);
Barnette v. Wells Fargo Nat'l Bank, 270 U. S. 438, 450-51 (1926).
aItiehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 223 (1929). The power exists under S262 of the Federal
Judicial Code rather than under S265. Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, 112 (1904); Toucey
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 134 (1941).
"See Ex parfe Baldwin, 291 U. S. 6so, 6z5 (1934); IsaCs v. Hobbs Tie & T. Co., 282 U. S. 734,
737 (193i); Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 321 (1931) and cases cited.
" Sec. 256, Rav. STAT. S711 (1875), 28 U. S. C. S371 (1940).
"Bankruptcy Act, §511, 311.
"Bankruptcy Act, §2(5). See Steelman v. All Continent Co., 301 U. S. 278, 289 (z937).
'Federal Judicial Code S265, Rav. STAT. 5720 (1875), 28 U. S. C. 5379 (940). See Toucey
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. xS, 132 (1941).
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ruptcy jurisdiction is "paramount and exclusive.""7 Thus, bankruptcy, reorganiza-
tion, or arrangement proceedings supersede general5" state receiverships,59 with the
limitation that in straight bankruptcy the appointment, if otherwise valid,6" must
have been made within four months prior to the petition. In certain circumstances
the bankruptcy court may stay proceedings in personam pending in other courts 1
The paramount character of the bankruptcy jurisdiction expresses itself also in the
limited res judicata effect of state adjudications rendered in violation of the bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction)" and in the power of the bankruptcy courts to prevent con-
tinuing misapplications of the Bankruptcy Act in state courts.
Where the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts exists, it has been said
that no power is given to surrender it to the state courts.64 But it is now under-
stood that the bankruptcy court may permit or even require the trial of certain
litigation in the state courts or release overencumbered assets!'
In a number of cases in which the trustee is a party, the jurisdiction of state courts
and federal courts is concurrent either on general principles expressly retained by
the Bankruptcy Act or by virtue of specific provisions of the Act to that effect. Thus,
for instance, the trustee's suit to recover assets the disposal of which by the debtor
amounted to a preferential transfer"6 or a fraudulent conveyance"' can be brought
in either the bankruptcy or a state court. Whether in all or some of the instances of
concurrent jurisdiction the defendant has a right of removal from a state to the
federal court is a question bristling with complicated issues on which there is a
scarcity of direct authority."
" 'Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342, 344 (1933); Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U. S. 178, 184
(1944).
"'Emil v. Hanley, 318 U. S. 515, 519 (1943).
o Bankruptcy Act, S2(a)(21).
"If the appointment of the receiver or assignee in insolvency was made pursuant to a statute which
is suspended because of its conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, the four-months limitation does not prevent
the federal court's assertion of its jurisdiction over the assets. See Emil v. Hanley, 318 U. S. 515,
520 n. 4 (1943); Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 327 (r93I). Whether the appointment of a receiver
for the purpose of "winding up" an insolvent corporation on the petition of a creditor pursuant to a
state statute comes within this rule or is excepted by implication of the Bankruptcy Act is a difficult
question on which state supreme courts and lower federal courts are in conflict. See 25 MINN. L. R*v.
103 (1940); 30 MINN. L. Rav. 638 (1946).
"See Bankruptcy Act, §§r1, 113, 116(4), construed in Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines, 299 U. S. 77
(1936).
"Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433 (1940).
'sLocal Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 (1934). See Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 790 (1941).
"U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Bray, 225 U. S. 205, 218 (i9tI); Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & T. CO., 282 U. S.
734, 739 (93). See note 12o, infra.
"Ex parre Baldwin, 291 U. S. 61o, 619 (1933); Thompson v. Magnolia Pet. Co., 309 U. S. 478,
483 (1940); Mangus v. Miller, 317 U. S. 178, I86 (1942); Prudence Corp. v. Ferris, 323 U. S.
65o (1945); Gardner v. New Jersey, 67 Sup. Ct. 467, 477 (1947).
"'Bankruptcy Act, 56o(b).
411d., S567(e), 70(c)(3).
" Cf. 2 COLLIER, BANxRuPTcY S23.21 (1 4 th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1940). At least four types of
cases where the trustee is a party to proceedings in a state court must be distinguished: (x) He may sue
in the state court by virtue of S23(a) and (b) (first clause) as the "universal successor" (See Clark v.
Williard, 292 U. S. 112, 114 (1934)) of the bankrupt with respect to the assets enumerated in S70,
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Another important problem which arises, particularly in reorganization proceed-
ings, is the question whether, apart from the exercise of the jurisdiction in rem and
the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the federal courts have exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction over controversies relating to the estate. The answer de-
pends largely on the interpretation of Sections 2 and 23 of the Bankruptcy Act and
provided that the cause of action is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts apart
from bankruptcy; (2) he may sue in the state court on a "non-inherited cause of action" (Hergct v.
Central Bank Co., 324 U. S. 4, 8 (1945)) vested in him as representative of the creditors by the Bank-
ruptcy Act, §§6o (preferential transfers), 67 and 70(e) (fraudulent conveyances) in conjunction with
§23(b); (3) he may sue on a cause of action originating in him as a consequence of his administration,
although it is not free from doubt whether such an action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court (see in/ra, Topic D); (4) he may be sued in a state court for acts of his administration
pursuant to Rule 66 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U. S. C. following §723(c) (1940)) in
connection with §66 of the Federal Judicial Code (24 STAT. 554 (1887) as amended, 28 U. S. C.
§125 (940)). Cf. McGreavey v. Straw, go N. H. 130, 5 A.2d 270 (1939); Robinson v. Trustees,
318 Mass. 121, 6o N. E. 2d 593 (1945); Vass v. Conron Bros. CO., 59 F.,d 969 (C. C. A. 2d 5932).
In these four types of cases concurrent original federal jurisdiction may or may not exist. In respect
to Class (i), concurrent federal jurisdiction must be predicated either on the existence of a federal
question or diversity of citizenship between the bankrupt and the defendant. The Bankruptcy Act
in this respect generalizes the principle underlying the celebrated "assignee clause" of §24 of the Federal
Judicial Code. The mere fact that the trustee in bankruptcy is a party does not constitute a federal
question in accord with the rule pertaining to federal receivers. Barnette v. WVells Fargo Nevada Nat.
Bank, 270 U. S. 438 (925); Bush v. Elliott, 202 U. S. 477 (igo6); Lovell v. Newman, 227 U. S.
412 (1913); Gableman v. Peoria Ry., 179 U. S. 335 (1900). In Class (2) concurrent jurisdiction
exists by fiat of the Bankruptcy Act, although a suit based on §70(e) does not ncessarily involve a
federal question. Whether in Class (3) there is concurrent federal jurisdiction independently of diversity
of citizenship or the existence of a federal question depends on the construction of §§a(a)(7) and 23.
See in/ra, Topic D. If diversity of citizenship be required, apparently the trustee's citizenship would be
the controlling factor, a result in accord with the rule announced by the courts in respect to quasi-
assignee receivers (apparently in disregard of the "assignee" clause). Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222
(i88o); Irvine v. Bankard, 181 Fed. 206 (C. C. Md. sgso); but cf. Serev. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332
(U. S. i8io). Finally, in Class (4) federal jurisdiction must be predicated either on diversity of citizen-
ship between the plaintiff and the trustee or on the presence of a federal question.
Removability presupposes generally, of course, that concurrent original federal jurisdiction could have
been invoked by the plaintiff. The only exception in this respect which might be important here
concerns the removal of certain causes against officers of federal courts under §33 of the Judicial Code.
However, even in this instance it is thought that the general rule will apply, in as much as the field is
narrowly restricted to acts done under specific orders. Cf. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U. S. 25, 31 (1934). As an
example of the general rule, it has been held that removability of a suit falling under Class (s) on
grounds of diversity requires diversity of citizenship between the bankrupt and the defendant. Whit-
man v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 7o F. Supp. 9 (D. Minn. 1947). However, where the citizenship of the
bankrupt controls the original jurisdiction, no additional diversity of citizenship between trustee and
defendant should be required for removal purposes; this follows by analogy from the law relating to
the "assignee" clause. The removability of actions under Class (2) raises further questions. In the
first place, it is not clear whether or not the wording and history of §§23(b), 6o, 67 and 70 indicate
that the choice of the forum by the trustee should be final, unlike the result under §23(a) and the
first clause of §23 (b), which put the trustee in the exact position of the bankrupt. The exclusion of a
removal would be in consonance with many express provisions in modern statutes (see the list in Gay
v. Ruff, 292 U. S. 25, 36 n. 17 (1934)) and the construction which the majority of lower federal
courts have placed upon §16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (52 STAT., xo68 (1938), 29 U. S. C.
§2x6 (1940)). Crouse v. North American Aviation, 68 F. Supp. 934 (W. D. Mo. 1946); Young v.
Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241 (E. D. Mo. 1946), and cases cited. If this view is not accepted,
removability might be based upon the federal nature and regulation of the cause of action involved when
the suit is under §6o(b) or 67(e). However, in a suit under §70(e) no federal question seems to be
involved, and while original federal jurisdiction is given by the Act without diversity, removal would
seem to require diversity between the defendant and the trustee (rather than the creditor from whom the
trustee derives the right).
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Sections 24 and 256 of the Federal Judicial Code, a question which we discuss below.
5. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy, summary and plenary
The jurisdiction which the federal courts exercise in the administration of the
Bankruptcy Act is either plenary or summary. The Act itself does not specify when
summary jurisdiction is permissible except in a few cases.' In some instances there
is reference to cases "where plenary proceedings are necessary."70  It is now well
settled, however, that summary proceedings are permissible in purely administrative
matters, and in all controversies over assets either where such assets are in the actual
or constructive possession of the bankruptcy court and not held adversely under an
ingenuous and substantial claim or where the defendant consents to the summary
jurisdiction of the court.7 ' Interestingly, the court has the power to determine by
summary proceedings whether the claim of the one in possession is ingenuous and
substantial. 2 The practice in summary proceedings is largely regulated by the
General Orders in Bankruptcy 73 issued under Sections 3o and 75 b of the Bankruptcy
Act, while the practice in plenary proceedings follow the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, even in summary proceedings the Federal Rules are followed
in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act or the General Orders.74  The
principal difference"' consists in the fact that summary jurisdiction is usually exer-
cised in the first instance by the referee rather than the judge, whereas 'the latter
must hear all plenary suits.'
6. Jurisdiction in bankruptcy, territorial or nationwide
It has been mentioned above that Congress has the power to give the federal
district courts nationwide jurisdiction but that it is a question of statutory law
whether it has done so in a given case. The Bankruptcy Act has caused considerable
confusion in this respect.
According to the wording of the statute, the federal courts which exercise original
jurisdiction in bankruptcy 77 are invested with this jurisdiction "within their respec-
tive territorial limits. '78  With respect to railroad and corporate reorganizations and
arrangement proceedings, the Act contains the additional provision that the court
"Bankruptcy Act, §§67(a)(4), 57(0), 70(a)(8). See Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U. S.
426, 431 n. 7 (1924).
"Bankruptcy Act, §§6o(b), 67(e), 70(e)(3).
" See Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97 (944) and cases there cited.
"Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 15 (s9o2); May v. Henderson, 268 U. S. 1s, 116 (1925). It
may be noted that Justice Frankfurter has recently made the following comment on this test: "Possession,
actual or constructive, is a legal concept full of pitfalls. Even where only private interests are involved
the determination of possession, as bankruptcy cases, for instance, abundantly prove, engenders much
confusion and conflict." Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 40 (1945).
"See ix U. S. C. A. following §53.
7"i d., G. 0. 37.
75 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §23.02 ff. (4th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1940).
'eid., §§38.02, 38.09; Page v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 286 U. S. 269 (1932).
"
7 Bankruptcy Act, §x(xo).711111., §2(a).
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possesses jurisdiction over the property of the debtor wherever located," and it has
been held that these words apply to property located outside as well as inside the
district of the domiciliary court.s° While there is no similar specific provision in
the Act governing straight bankruptcy, it is questionable whether the omission pro-
duces a substantial difference from the reorganization proceeding. This conclusion
is substantiated by the fact that the "wherever located" clause was inserted in the
sections on reorganization and arrangements by Congress for the purpose of elimi-
nating the defects existing under the old federal chancery receiver practice!' The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that since all property of the debtor "wherever
located" vests in the trustee upon his appointment, the court of bankruptcy at least
thereby acquires exclusive jurisdiction over the assets, even if outside the district,
to the extent that they are in the actual or constructive possession of its officer 82
But there are decisions by the Court which indicate that even without and before the
appointment of the trustee, where the jurisdiction cannot be predicated upon the
actual or constructive possession of the court's officer, the assets held by the bankrupt
in any district are placed in custodia legis upon the filing of the petition," and that
the primary court of bankruptcy acquires full jurisdiction over such assets at that
time. 4 The Court has held that as a consequence of such jurisdiction the domi-
ciliary court may order and confirm the sale of lands located in another district8 5
The acquisition of this jurisdiction over the property has been held to entitle the
court to protect it against any interference, by judicial proceedings or otherwise, and
to extend its process for that purpose outside its territorial limits. To be sure, the
Supreme Court has decided this point only for reorganization proceedings.8" And
it has in two older cases used very strong language to the effect that in straight bank-
ruptcy proceedings the domiciliary court can issue process only within its district
and that if protective action be required outside it must be taken by the bankruptcy
court in that particular district in ancillary proceedings8 But although the majority
of the lower federal courts have relied on these cases, 8 the Supreme Court has
"Id., §§77(a), 111, 311. It should be noted that under the wording of §77 the jurisdiction over
property "wherever located" attaches only after the approval of the petition, while under S§x i and
311, in contradistinction to the wording of former S77B, the filing of the petition controls. The change
was made to eliminate the existing confusion. See I GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION §243 ff.
(1936); 2 id., §852; 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §3.04 (14th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1947).
:oContinental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 683 (x935).2 1 GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION §14 (1936); 2 id. 1413 n. 13.
"'Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & T. Co., 282 U. S. 734, 737 (1931); Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S.
342, 344 (1933); 2 GamEas, CORPORATE REOROANIZATION 1365 ff. (1936).
,,Acme Harveter Co. v. Beckman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300 (1911).
", Robertson v. Howard, 229 U. S. 254, a61 (1913).
"ibid.
'SEx parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 6zo, 615 (1934); Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U. S.
648, 683-4 (1935).
'Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. 102, 114 (I910); Acme Harvester Co. v. Beckman Lumber Co.,
222 U. S. 300, 311 (i911).
uSee, for example, Staunton v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 9th 191o); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. David, 49 F.2d 866 (C. C. A. 8th 1931); Noll v. Hodgson, 7o F.2d 19 (C. C. A. 4th 1934); 1
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §2.II (4th ed., Moore-Mulder 1940). In Mar-Tex Realization Corp. v.
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xecently made statements indicating that there is no difference between straight
bankruptcy and reorganization proceedings in this respect and that resort to ancillary
courts is proper but not necessary s9 Of course, if there is in fact no infringement
of the court's jurisdiction there is no cause for nationwide action.0 Since the juris-
diction of the reorganization court is more inclusive than that of the bankruptcy
court a wider range of protective action may be authorized and necessary,9 but
otherwise "the exclusive jurisdiction granted the reorganization court ...is that
which bankruptcy courts have customarily possessed.""2
Where plenary proceedings are necessary the territorial limits of the court must
be observed. This follows directly for straight bankruptcy proceedings from Section
23(a) with respect to suits which are regulated by this provision; and there are no
apparent reasons why the same rule should not apply to suits in the bankruptcy
courts under Sections 6o, 67, and 70. In reorganizations under Chapter X, Section
23 is made specifically inapplicable. Nevertheless, the lower federal courts have held
that their jurisdiction can be exercised only over persons in the district," and the
Supreme Court has recently referred to this rule without disapproval.94
D. The Legislative Technique of Regulating the Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy
Up to this point questions have been left open which depend directly upon the
systematic scheme underlying the various provisions in the Bankruptcy Act regula-
ting the jurisdiction of the courts in its administration. This has been done because
the subject has recently been dealt with by the Supreme Court9 ' in a decision which
overturns long-established views based on former cases and which carries implica-
tions which can be appreciated only in the light of the previous discussion.
The case involved an action in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York for an accounting and other relief, brought by trustees who had been ap-
pointed by the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in a reorganization
proceeding under Chapter X. The grounds for federal jurisdiction invoked were the
provisions in the Judicial Code relating to suits arising under laws of the United
States"" and to "all matters and proceedings" in bankruptcy.9r The district court
Wolfson, 145 F.,d 360, 362 (C. C. A. 2d 1944), Judge Clark volunteered the following language in a
reorganization case: "Unlike the territorially limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in an ordinary
liquidation proceeding, the summary power of a reorganization court is complete throughout the
country."
"'Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 61o, 615 (1934).
"'See United States v. Tacoma Oriental S. S. Co., 86 F.2d 363, 368 (C. C. A. 9th 1936) ("Juris-
diction over a person outside the lower court's jurisdiction is given to the lower court only if such person
is in some manner invading, interfering, or disposing of the debtor's res, and then only to the extent of
preventing or forestalling the invasion, interference or disposition of such res."). Thus, it is improper
for the court to order a person outside the district to execute a deed for the purpose of clearing title
to an asset of the estate. In re Lansley, 7 F.,d 888 (C. C. A. ad 1925).
" See Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 676 (935).
"Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U. S. x6x, 164 (1946).
"In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., 9ig F.2d 658, 664 (C. C. A. 3d 1941).
"Williams v. Austrian, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1452 n. 46 (1947).
"Williams v. Austrian, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1947).
"REv. STAT. 5§563, 629 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §4x(1) (1940).
17REv. STAT. S§563, 629 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §41(19) (1940).
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dismissed for want of jurisdiction," but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed " and,
on certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed.
The fundamental question involved was the scope of the grant of jurisdiction in
Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act and its relation to Section 23, which, by a specific
provision added by the revision of 1938,100 is made inapplicable to reorganization
proceedings under Chapter X. Section 2(a) confers upon all bankruptcy courts
.. such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original juris-
diction in proceedings under this Act ... to ...
(7) Cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and distributed,
and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise provided ...
Section 23 provides:
a. The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and in
equity, as distinguished from proceedings under this Act, between. . . trustees as such
and adverse claimants concerning the property acquired or claimed by the ...trustees,
in the same manner and to the same extent as though such proceedings had not been
instituted and such controversies had been between the bankrupts and such adverse claim-
ants.
b. Suits by the ...trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only in the courts where the
bankrupt might have- brought or prosecuted them if proceedings under this Act had not
been instituted, unless by consent of the defendant, except as provided in sections 6o, 67,
and 70 of this Act.
The juxtaposition of these two sections presented the following alternative analyses
of their interrelationship: (I) Section 2 grants power to the bankruptcy court to
adjudicate all questions involving the administration of the Bankruptcy Act except
in so far as this jurisdiction is limited and qualified by Section 23; (2) Section 2
grants only a limited jurisdiction to be exercised in summary proceedings and
Section 23 adds the regulation or grant of jurisdiction over plenary suits.
As long as Section 23 was applicable to all "proceedings in bankruptcy," the
question was chiefly of theoretical interest, since the scope of plenary jurisdiction,
except perhaps in one instance,1 0' was determined by Section 23. But, as pointed
out by the court in the Austrian case,' the elimination of Section 23 from proceed-
ings under Chapter X brought the problem to immediate practical significance in
's 67 F. Supp. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
x59 F.2d 67 (C. C. A. 2d 1947). Bankruptcy Act, §To2.
"
0 1 The only instance in which the question might have arisen before the amendment of 1938
concerned causes of action arising in the person of the trustee. See note 68, supra, under Class (3). It has
been argued by Ross, Federar 11riSdiction in Suits by Trustees in Bankruptcy, 2o IowA L. Rav. 565,
582 (1935), that Section 23 did not apply to this type of action because the bankrupt could not have
sued upon it, and that jurisdiction was conferred by §2(a)(7). If this view is correct, as suggested by 2
COLLiER, BANKRUPTCY §23.16, n. 12 and text (14th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1940), the further problem im-
mediately arises whether this grant of plenary jurisdiction is exclusive because of §256(6) of the Federal
Judicial Code. See infr the text to and following note 107. To the authors the nonapplicability of §23 to
this type of case seems, however, questionable and not particularly desirable since it might lead to artificial
distinctions-e.g., cases of conversion.
'" Williams v. Austrian, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1449, dissenting opinion 1456, 1458 (1947).
IO
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as much as the mere fact that a cause of action is vested in a trustee in bankruptcy
does not make it one "arising under a statute of the United States"'1 3 and at any
rate would not dispense with the requirement of the jurisdictional amount. Probably
misled by an erroneous reading of a decision rendered under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1867,1"" the Supreme Court had previously intimated in a number of cases105 that
the words "controversies ... as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy" con-
tained in Section 23(a) indicated that Section 2 granted only summary jurisdiction
and that all plenary jurisdiction depended upon Section 23. However, in the present
case the court reviewed the history of the two sections and came to the conclusion
that Section 2 granted full summary and plenary jurisdiction "except as herein other-
wise provided,"' 0 and that while Section 23 contained such exception for straight
bankruptcy and other rehabilitation proceedings no such limitation existed for the
reorganization court under Chapter X. Although Justice Frankfurter entered a
vigorous dissent, which pointed out that the decision destroyed the desirable dis-
tribution of the judicial business under the Bankruptcy Act between the state and
federal courts,,0 7 it is not for us to presume that the court will reverse its position
in the near future. Consequently, some of the implications and problems following
from the "new view" should be investigated. Of those which we here notice, a few
were posed but not answered by the court.
i. In the first place, will the effect of the majority opinion be that the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all plenary actions by trustees in reorgani-
zation under Chapter X? Although the majority specifically reserved the question,
the dissent intimated that this result would have to follow. Section 256 of the
Judicial Code vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts "of all matters and
proceedings in bankruptcy."'0" This section of the Code was inserted by the revisers
of x874 and employed the terms used in Section i of the Bankruptcy Act of 867.1°9
But even at that time it was not considered as settled that the provision of the code
made the plenary jurisdiction based upon Section i of the i867 Act exclusive." 0
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 not many, if any, problems could arise,:" since
201 See note 68, supra.
0' Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516 (,875).
' See Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524 (igoo); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U. S. 367 (1934).
' The Court was not troubled by the fact that this interpretation construed §23 (a) as if it read "as
distinguished from other proceedings under this Act."
..7 Justice Frankfurter has consistently warned against any construction increasing the scope of the
business of the federal courts. See, e.g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 6o2 (1943); Busby v. Electric
Utilities Union, 323 U. S. 72, 77 (1944).
105 REV. ST.T. §711 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §371 (1940).
100Section i of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 provided that the "... several district courts of the
United States be . . . constituted courts of bankruptcy, and they shall have original jurisdiction . . . in
all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy." 14 STAT. 517, §1 (1867).
... In Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 133 (1876) the question was specifically reserved. The
lower federal and state courts were fairly well divided on the issue. See Clark v. Ewing, 3 Fed. 83
(N. D. Ill. 188o). The argument was apparently not raised in McKenna v. Simpson, 129 U. S. 506
(x888).
11
. See note 1or, S=Pra.
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Section 23 and, after i9o3, Sections 6ob, 67e and 7oe made it clear' that the plenary
jurisdiction of the federal courts under these sections was concurrent. The revision
of 1938 changed the words "bankruptcy proceedings" in Section 2 and "proceedings
in bankruptcy" in Section 23 to "proceedings under this act," but no such change was
made in the Federal Judicial Code. Even if it should follow 12 that the change in
the reading of the word "proceedings" in the Bankruptcy Act should change the
meaning of the word "proceedings" used in the Judicial Code in Sections 41(x9) and
256(6), it would not mean that federal jurisdiction over plenary actions under Chap-
ter X is exclusive unless the additional and unnecessary assumption were made that
the Chandler Act, by substituting "under this act" for "in bankruptcy" in Section 2,
made the same change by implication in the Judicial Code. The fact that Section
,iiI of the Bankruptcy Act provides specifically that the jurisdiction over the assets
is conclusive might also strengthen the argument that the in personam jurisdiction
of the reorganization court is concurrent.
2. Assuming the jurisdiction to be concurrent, a suit brought in the state court
would of course be removable into the federal court provided that the requisite
jurisdictional amount and either appropriate diversity of citizenship between the
trustee and defendant or a question based on a federal statute other than the Bank-
ruptcy Act is present 13
3. The plenary jurisdiction of the domiciliary court would not be nationwide
merely because of the changed reading of the term "proceeding" in Section 2, since
the extraterritorial scope of the protective summary jurisdiction does not follow from
the term "proceeding" but from Section III.
1 4
4. The decision will probably have some effect on straight bankruptcy proceed-
ings. In the first place, it lends support to the view that jurisdiction over actions
which originate in the person of the trustee may be based on Section 2(7) and
brought in the federal court as bankruptcy court11 without further qualifications
unless they are included in the exception of Section 23.116 In the second place, the
decision might possibly affect the construction of Section 24. It has been held that
appeals from decisions under Sections 6o, 67, and 70 in connection with Section 23b
followed the federal rules and not Section 24 because the words "controversies arising
in proceedings in bankruptcy" in Section 24 apply only to controversies adjudicated
"' Cf. the dissent of Justice Frankfurter in the Austian case.
" See note 68, supra. Of course, if the trustee sues the defendant in a court of the state of which
the defendant but not the trustee is a citizen, no removal on the basis of diversity is possible although
the federal court of that state would have had original jurisdiction since such removal requires that the
defendant be a non-resident of the forum. Cf. DoBm, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 365 (s928).
12' See suPra Topic C( 5).
11Under the terminology of the Bankruptcy Act the federal court sits as a "court of bankruptcy"
whenever its jursidiction depends on the Bankruptcy Act and is independent of diversity of citizen-
ship or a question arising under a federal law other than the Bankruptcy Act. While the procedure of
the federal court sitting as bankruptcy court in plenary actions is identical with that where it sits on
other grounds of federal jurisdiction, its substantive powers might vary. Thus, see National Automatic
Tool Co. v. Goldie, 27 F. Supp. 399 (D. Minn. 1939).
11 See note joI, supra.
JURISDICTION IN BANKRUPTCY 103
under Section 2 of the Act. 17  Under the new reading of Section 2 it could be
argued that the controversies mentioned in the exception clause of Section 23 (b)
fall within the jurisdiction granted in Section 2 and are therefore appealable under
Section 24.118 The recent change of the period for appeal under the Federal Rules
to thirty days119 will make the question moot except where the judgment involves
less than $500.
5. The last point to be mentioned is the question whether the non-domiciliary
federal court to which the trustee resorts as bankruptcy court can direct the trustee
to sue in the state court if the cause of action depends entirely on state law and other
grounds for federal jurisdiction are not present. An affirmative answer would be in
line with intimations in Supreme Court cases120 and would seemingly overcome the
chief objections raised by Justice Frankfurter against the results of the Austrian case.
In the light of the doubts here suggested it would seem advisable to clarify the
proposed revision of the Federal Judicial Code1 2 so as to take care of the problems.
II
THE BusINEss OF THE FEDERAL COURTS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
After this consideration of the technical legal aspects of the jurisdiction of federal
courts in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act a brief discussion of the major
determinations to be made in the various proceedings under the Act seems to be in
order.
A. Straight Bankruptcy Proceedings
"Straight bankruptcy" proceedings12 have a two-fold purpose: to convert the
assets of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among the creditors, and also to
relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him
... Lowenstein v. Reikes, 54 F.ad 481 (C. C. A. 2d 1931); Exchange Nat. Bank v. Meikle, 6r F.2d
176 (C. C. A. 9th 1932); In Matter of Finkelstein, xo2 F.ad 688 (C. C. A. 2d 1939); 2 COLLIER,
BANXRUPTCY S24.10 (1 4th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1940).
... It could, however, still be argued that 524 does not apply to all adjudications under §2 but only
to those rendered in summary proceedings, although there is apparently no direct authority to support
this view.
... See the amendment to Rule 73, to be effective three months after the adjournment of the first
regular session of the Eightieth Congress.
20 See supra note 65 and text. One writer has recently taken the position that the federal courts
cannot abdicate jurisdiction which has been conferred exclusively on them by Congress. Coleman,
The Effect of the Presence of a State Law Question on the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 5 NAT.
Bt. J. 257, 267 (1947). But might it not be said that the bankruptcy couri, in ordering the trustee
to sue in the state court, is not abdicating exclusively conferred jurisdiction but is only exercising its
supervisory power over the trustee as an officer of the court? This reasoning, of course, would not
deprive defendant of his right to remove within the limits pointed out in note 113.
"'In its proposed form, §1334 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, ex-
clusive of the courts of the states, of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy." See H. R. Doc. No. 7124,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). This wording will probably increase the difficulties foreseen by Justice
Frankfurter.
... 11cterm "straight bankruptcy" is used by Justice Douglas in Emil v. Hanley, 318 U. S. 515,
517 (1943).
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to start afresh, free from the obligations consequent upon business misfortunes 1 3
The proceedings commence with a petition by the bankrupt 24 or his creditors' 2 1
An involuntary petition must be predicated upon one of the six specifically enum-
erated and defined acts of bankruptcy -26 If the prerequisite conditions are fulfilled
the adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt follows.' 27  Except in non-asset cases
begun by voluntary petition,12 8 a trustee is appointed' 29 for the collection of the non-
exempt estate and its conversion into cash 1 ° The adjudication of any person except
a corporation has the effect of a petition for discharge' 3 ' which is granted unless the
debtor has committed one of a number of specifically listed acts which exclude this
privilege 2  The discharge prevents the enforcement 3' of all debts which are
provable in bankruptcy and do not belong to certain classes which are exempt from
discharge'3 4  Generally the dischargeability of a specific debt is decided by the court
in which the enforcement proceeding is pending upon the appropriate plea 3"' and
not by the bankruptcy court. In certain circumstances, however, the bankruptcy
court might have to decide the question.' 6
'-2'Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273, 277 (193x). The purpose of bankruptcy to help the poor
but unfortunate debtor through the privilege of discharge is a comparatively recent development. The
discharge provisions have been progressively liberalized and the scope of provable and therefore dis-
chargeable debts constantly increased. See Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 3!
MINN. L. REV. 401, 406, 407 (1947); 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §63.03 (14th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1941).
The discharge is, of course, the incentive for voluntary petitions which greatly outnumber the involuntary
petitions. Thus, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946, there were about 8,3oo voluntary petitions
in bankruptcy and 26o involuntary. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AOauNtsTnA-vE
OFFICE oF THE UNITED STATES CoUsrs 142 (1946).
1' Bankruptcy Act §59(a) in conjunction with §4(a) (defining persons who may become volunary
bankrupts).
... Id., §59(b) in conjunction with §4(b) (defining the persons who can become involunary bank-
rupts).
...Id., §3(a) (x-6). The system has been bitterly criticized as medieval and clumsy by Professor
Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HAv. L. REV.
189 (1938); but see Riesenfeld, Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. REV. 40, 414
(1947). Acts of bankruptcy must be carefully and separately pleaded; defects can be cured only
within certain limits. Cf. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §18.26 (s 4 th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1940); In re Dc
Luxe Oil Co., 36 F. Supp. 287 (D. Minn. 1940).
21 Id., §i8(d), (e), (f) and (g). ... General Order 15.
119 Bankruptcy Act, §44. 1o Id., §47.
I~td., §14(a). 1:9 Id., 5914(c) (1-7).
's The precise legal effect of a discharge is the subject of much discussion. To a large extent it is a
federal question although beyond that state law becomes operative. See Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S.
625 (1913); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 (1934). Thus, state law may permit assignment
of a discharged cause of action and consider it as sufficient consideration for a new promise, Stanek v.
White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 N. NV. 784 (1927); Comment, 31 MIN. L. REV. 391 (1947), or the entry
of a judgment in personam with the execution permanently stayed for the purpose of enforcing the lien
under an attachment or garnishment as long as the latter itself is not affected by bankruptcy. See Muss-
man and Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REV. s, 68 ff. (1942).
1 4 Bankruptcy Act, §17(a) (r-6).
'If the discharge is obtained before judgment, the discharge is pleaded in bar by the defendant
bankrupt; if the discharge was obtained after judgment, a petition to stay the enforcement or to enter a
satisfaction on the record is made. See Comment, 25 MINN. L. REv. 790 (1941).
.. The bankruptcy court may except certain debts from the discharge, viz., debts which had been
scheduled in a prior proceeding in which a discharge was denied. See Comment, 31 MINN. L. REV.
491 (1947). The bankruptcy court may stay pending suits against the bankrupt on claims which
are dischargeable until the question of his discharge is determined. Apparently the permissible and more
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The collection and distribution of assets presents two major phases, viz. the
collection of the assets and proof and allowance of claims or adjudication of inter-
ventions for reclamation purposes. The bankrupt estate is composed of all non-
exempt assets of the bankrupt, 3T title to which vests in the trustee as of the date of
the petition. 8' But the rights of the trustee go beyond his position as universal
successor of the banlkrupt. Because of his capacity as representative of the creditors,
he may avoid certain transactions which are valid as against the debtor himself.
These transactions are "preferential transfers" as defined in the Bankruptcy Act,'39
judicial liens obtained within four months prior to the filing of the petition while
the debtor was insolvent, 4 ' fraudulent conveyances as defined by the Bankruptcy
Act itself,14 ' and fraudulent or otherwise voidable conveyances under state law. 142
In order to avail himself of all rights given by state law to creditors, the trustee is
also by specific provision of the Act placed in the position of a creditor armed with
process.' 43 Liens which are not voidable on one of these grounds survive bank-
ruptcy, although no judicial enforcement proceedings outside of the bankruptcy
court may be begun after the petition has been filed.' All assets in the actual or
constructive possession of the bankrupt are within the summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court, 48 and title or other interests in them must be asserted in the
bankruptcy court through summary reclamation proceedings or by other petitions in
the nature of interventions. 46  The proof and allowance of provable 47 claims and
determination of their priority148 follows a fairly informal procedure in the bank-
desirable practice is to petition the court in which the action is pending before resorting to the bankruptcy
court. See Connel v. Walker, 291 U. S. i, 5 (r934); I COLLIER, BANcRUPTCY §I1.08 (14th ed., Moore-
Mulder 1940). Beyond these cases, the bankruptcy court will intervene only in exceptional instances to
vindicate a discharge. See Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 790 (941); Glenn, Effect of Discharge in
Bankruptcy: Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 531 (944).
137 Bankruptcy Act, S§6, 7o(a), construed in Myers v. MatleY, 318 U. S. 622 (943).
"' Id., §7o(a). Suits begun by the bankrupt before the filing of the petition are not terminated
because of the filing of the petition, but the trustee has under § I(c) the threefold choice of (I) starting
a new suit and abating the old one, (2) intervening in the old one, or (3) letting the bankrupt continue
although the results conclude the trustee. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U. S. 161, 165 (946). Bona fide
purchasers from the bankrupt are protected under Sections 21(g) and 7o(d).
"O Id., §6o in connection with §1(30).
"'Id., §67(a). For details see Mussman and Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINt. L.
REv. 1 (1942); Fischer v. Pauline Oil CO., 309 U. S. 294 (1940).
1111d., §67(d).
.. Id., §70(c) and (e).
"'Id., §70(c). The rights do not depend on the actual existence of a creditor. Where state law
attributes to a lien creditor the rights of a bona fide purchaser, the trustee enjoys apparently the same
rights regardless of whether chattels or land is involved. See Comment, 25 MINN. L. Rav. 514 (941).
But otherwise the trustee is neither a bona fide purchaser, Glenn, The Chandler Act and the Trustee as a
Bona Fide Purchaser, 25 VA L. REv. 885 (1939), nor a purchaser at a judicial sale. Myers v. Madey,
38 U. S. 622 (1943).
"' Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & T. Co. 282 U. S. 734 (1931). If enforcement has begun, the proceedings
whether legal or equitable will not be superseded. Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318 (1931); Emil v.
Hanley, 318 U. S. 515 (1943).
1"' See note 71, supra, and text.
"'See 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§23.11 24.31 (14th ed., Moore-Oglebay, 1940), id., §57.07.
"" See the catalogue in §63, Bankruptcy Act.
"' Bankruptcy Act, §64.
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ruptcy court. 49 From time to time dividends are declared and distributed. 50  After
all available 4assets are collected and their proceeds distributed the proceedings are
closed.' 5 '
B. Railroad Reorganization Proceedings under Section 77
This section was added to the Act in 1933 to eliminate difficulties which had
arisen under the old "umbrella" receiverships, although this paternity has left its
marks on the powers and jurisdiction of the court. The present form of the statute
is chiefly due to a revision of i935y 2
The proceedings are initiated by either involuntary or voluntary petition which
has to be approved by the court.""s Upon approval, a trustee is appointed subject
to ratification by the Interstate Commerce Commission.ls The trustee possesses
all the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy, and, if authorized by the judge, of a
chancery receiver,s' but in contrast to the latter is vested with title. '
According to Section 77(1) the jurisdiction and powers of the court, the duties of
the debtor, and the rights and liabilities of creditors, and of all persons, with respect
to the debtor and its property are the same as in straight bankruptcy in so far as
such a construction is consistent with other provisions of the section. However,
there are a number of important differences from the ordinary bankruptcy proceed-
ings, differences which follow directly from the contrasting purpose of the reorgani-
zation proceedings, viz. rehabilitation instead of liquidation. To transform the
embarrassed enterprise into a going concern with a sound capital structure, all
creditors, secured and unsecured, as well as the stockholders must be brought within
the sweep of the plan and the control over the assets must be tightened.
As in straight bankruptcy, the reorganization court obtains exclusive jurisdiction
over all the assets of the debtor in its actual or constructive possession, wherever
located. Although the statute predicates this jurisdiction upon the approval of the
petition' 57 and does not contain an exception relating to property held adversely, it
is, now recognized that the date of filing controls and that property held adversely
under a claim of title is not under the full sweep of the summary powers.'5 8 How-
ever, in the details there are significant changes. The proceedings supersede or affect
proceedings pending in other courts which straight bankruptcy proceedings would
leave untouched. Thus, state and federal receivers "of all or any part of the property
1 5 0See id., 5565(a) and (b), 47(a)(11). '1 d., S§47(13) and (14), 55(e), 2(a) (8).
'"Id., S57. The substantive rules determining the provability and allowability of claims are
basically principles of federal law and equity. "For nothing decided in Eric Ry. v. Tompkins . .. requires
a court of bankruptcy, in applying the statutes of the United States governing the liquidation of bankrupt
estates, to adopt local rules of law in determining what claims are provable, or to be allowed, or how the
bankrupts estate is to be distributed among claimants." Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S. 726, 732 (1945).
See also Vanston Bondholders Prot. Com. v. Green, 67 Sup. Ct. 237 (1946).
212See 5 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§77.O1, 77.02 (1 4 th ed., Stephenson-Seligson, 1943).
""
5Bankruptcy Act, §77(a). ... Id., S77(c)(1).
... Id., §77(c)(21). 15 Ibid. 257 1d., 577(a).
... See the dictum in Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U. S. 161, 164 (1946). The case is also noteworthy
for its holding that the passage of title to the trustee did not abate actions commenced by a stockholder
of the debtor in a stockholder's suit.
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of a debtor" appointed under other proceedings are displaced in favor of the reorgan-
ization trustee regardless of the time of their appointment15 9 The reorganization
court can stay pending proceedings for the enforcement of a lien 60 and can even
by summary process enjoin the non-judicial enforcement of collateral in the hands
of the secured creditors. 6 The reorganization court has larger powers to stay in
personam suits against the debtor than the bankruptcy court.1 62  It may, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, stay any suit, whether pending at the time of the
petition or not, particularly if the result of the suit would be a burden on the estate.
The mere fact that a jury verdict might result in a larger recovery is not a sufficient
ground for a stay' 63 although such judgment would apparently be conclusive if
filed for proof.'6 4 This result is contrary to the rule which seems to be conceded for
straight bankruptcy' but in line with that announced by the Supreme Court for
the old "umbrella" receiverships 6' and recently affirmed under the full faith and
credit clause for state receiverships, at least for suits commenced prior to the appoint-
ment of the receiver 67 Since the straight bankruptcy rules for provability and dis-
chargeability do not control in reorganization proceedings,"" it is not inconsistent
to assume that different principles for the conclusive effect of post-petition judgments
against the debtor apply in such proceedings. Furthermore, it should be noted that
Section 77 expressly provides that "suits or claims for damages caused by the opera-
tion of trains ... may be filed and prosecuted to judgment in any court of competent
jurisdiction."' 9 According to its terms, the provision seems to cover suits for pre-
petition damages which are commenced or prosecuted after the petition and against
the debtorY0 and it would follow that such judgments are conclusive for proof and
allowance 7  In the converse situation, where the reorganization court has decided
upon the existence and amount of a claim, the result cannot be questioned after the
discharge and the return of full control to the debtor'
"'Bankruptcy Act, S77(i). Apparently receivers appointed in foreclosure and cognate suits are not
"receivers of any part of the corporate property" within the meaning of this section. Cf. Duparquet v.
Evans, 297 U. S. 2i6, 222 (1936).
"Old., §77(j). 'Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U. S. 648, 675 (1935).
162 Bankruptcy Act, §77(j).
16. Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines, 299 U. S. 77' (1936). A reorganization court under §77B should
not enjoin the prosecution of a damage claim against the debtor in a state court if plaintiff needs the
judgment for recovery on an insurance policy.
... This follows from the reasoning of the court in the Munson case which implies that the court
felt that the judgment could be presented as conclusive proof for allowance. But contra, as to the
conclusive effect of such judgment in proceedings under Chapter X, except where the trustee has been
made a party with the consent of the court, is 6 CoLsmE, BANKR pTcy S9.o6 (14 th ed., Moore-Oglebay,
1947), and apparently Matter of Paramount Publix Corp., 85 F.2d 42 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
'"See note 43, SUpra. '"Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 2f8 (1929).
""Morris v. Jones, 67 Sup. Ct. 451 (1947). For a critical comment, see Harper, The Supreme
Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 COL. L. Xtv. 883, 884ff. (1947).




0 See Robinson v. Trustees, 318 Mass. 121, 6o N. E. ad 593 (1945),
"in re Chicago & E. I. Ry., 1x F.2d 785 (C. C. A. 7th 194r).
"l Tis result would follow from the discharge provision of §77(f) regardless of the res judicata
effect of the decision by the reorganization court. See note 43, sUpra, and text.
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Great confusion exists with respect to suits against the trustee. It is now settled
that because of Section 66 of the Judicial Code the trustee can be sued without leave
from the reorganization court "in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying
on the business" as long as the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of the reorganization
court is not interfered with. 73 It is arguable that additional suability follows ap-
parently from Section 77(j) with respect to damages resulting from the operation
of trains regardless of whether or not the cause of action arose prior to the trustee's
appointment 174 Jurisdiction over such an action against the trustee follows the
general principles. Federal jurisdiction, accordingly, depends either on the presence
of a separate federal question apart from the pendency of reorganization proceedings
and the appointment of the trustee or on the diversity of citizenship between the
trustee and the plaintiff." The venue is regulated by Section 51 of the Judicial
Code. It should be noted, however, that this section is satisfied by "the designation
by a foreign corporation of an agent for service of process in conformity with the
law of the state in which suit is brought against it in one of the federal courts for
that state,"' " and that "the effect of Section 66 is to place the trustee operating the
road upon the same plane with railroad companies as respects the mode of
service."' 77  Consequently, if the requisite conditions of federal jurisdiction are
present the trustee may be sued in any federal court in which the railroad could
have been sued through service on the appr9priate agent."' State venue statutes are
of no effect in this connection."7
The most important stage of the proceedings is, of course, the adoption of the
reorganization plan. It proceeds in several steps.' The plan as evolved under the
guidance of the Interstate Commerce Commission is approved by it and certified to
the court. The court hears objections and approves the plan if satisfied that it is
equitable and fair and in compliance with other provisions of the statute. The plan
is then submitted for a vote to the various materially affected classes of stockholders
"" Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 66 Sup. Ct. 937 (1946).
..' See the dicta in In re Chicago & E. 1. Ry., 121 F.2d 785 (C. C. A. 7th x941). But contra is
Robinson v. Trustees, supra note 170, which holds §77(j) inapplicable to suits against the trustee for
pre-reorganization damages.
"" Section 23 of the Act, even if applicable to railroad reorganizations, would not compel a different
result in respect to claims against the trustee of the kind envisaged by §66 of the Judicial Code or
§7 7 (J) of the Bankruptcy Act.
"'Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U. S. 165 (1939).
""Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U. S. 456, 464 (1896).
... Jacobowitz v. Thomson, 141 F.2d 72 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). The view of Judge Caffey in Dugan
v. Gardner, 68 F. Supp. 709 (S. D, N. Y. 1946) that only a resident plaintiff may sue under such
circumstances seems to miscontrue the combined effect of the two Supreme Court cases cited in notes
176 and 177, supra.
'" CI. r MooRE's FFE.aL PstAcscn r §2.07 (1938). Obviously Chapman v. St. Louis & S. W. Ry.,
7V F. Supp. 1017 (N. D. Tex. 1947), misconceived this rule and also erred in invoking Rule 17 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for suits against receivers. The recent amendment to Rule 17 expressly
excludes receivers.
" Bankruptcy Act, §77(e).
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and creditors whose claims have been allowed, and, if accepted by the requisite
majorities, is confirmed by the court.""
C. Corporate Reorganization under Chapter X
The functions and jurisdiction of the court in the reorganization of business
corporations under Chapter X are very similar to those in railroad reorganizations.
As a consequence, cases decided under Section 77 constitute, within limits, precedents
for the reorganization courts under Chapter X and vice versa... 2  The chief differ-
ence concerning jurisdiction is the express provision for the inapplicability of Section
23, the effect of which has been discussed above. 
18
The proceedings are initiated by a voluntary or involuntary petition 8s  which
must be approved by the court.8 5 and which vests in the reorganization court ex-
clusive summary jurisdiction over all the debtor's assets which are not held adversely
under claim of title. s6 From the date of the filing the court possesses ample protec-
tive powers and may temporarily stay not only prior pending bankruptcy, receiver-
ship, or mortgage foreclosure proceedings but also other suits against the debtor if they
tend to hamper the administration.8 7 The subsequent approval of the petition
automatically stays a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, or equity
receivership proceeding and any act or other proceeding to enforce a lien against the
debtor's property' 8 The reorganization trustee'8 9 or debtor in possession'90 is
entitled to obtain possession from such trustee or receiver, including foreclosure
receivers, by turnover order if necessary and regardless of the four-months rule
applicable in straight bankruptcy. 9'
Suits in personam against the debtor may be commenced 9 2 or prosecuted even
after the approval of the petition so long as they do not hamper the administration
... On the functions of the court in these steps, see R. F. C. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 66 Sup.
Ct. z282 (1946). On the permissible terms of a plan see also Ecker v. Western Pacific R. R., 318 U. S.
448 (1943); Group of Investors v. Milwaukee R. R., 318 U. S. 523 (1943). For a detailed and illumi-
nating study, see Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1193 (1943)-
182 Cf. 6 COLLIER, BANKRupTc" §O.53 (14th ed., Moore-Oglebay, I947).
... See the discussion supra under I-D.
aS'Bankruptcy Act, §i26 ff.
""' Id., §141 f.
1"Id., §izr. Assets which are held under an undisputed claim of a mere security interest are
apparently under the summary jurisdiction of the court. See 6 COLLIER, BANKR UPTV §§3.05, 14.03[2].1871 d., §113. For a construction of the portion of this section which relates to bankruptcy, see
Duggan v. Sansberry, 327 U. S. 499 (1946). For limitations applying to stays of in personam suits see
Foust v. Munson S. S. Lines, 299 U. S. 77 (z936), discussed supra, notes x63 and 164 and text.
" Bankruptcy Act, §xx6.
189 Appointment is mandatory if the liquidated debts exceed $250,000. Id., §56.
*A debtor in possession is vested with the rights and subject to the duties of a reorganization
trustee. Id., §I88.
... Id., §257. Cf. Emil v. Hanley, 318 U. S. 515, 522 (1942), recognizing that §2(a)(21) authorizes
turnover orders in these cases.
"
2 The commencement of suits for pre-reorganization claims against the debtor after the appointment
of a trustee may raise serious problems as to venue and service in as much as the corporation no longer
operates the road. See the discussion on this point in Dugan v. Gardner, 68 F. Supp. 709 (S. D. N. Y.
X946).
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or affect tide, and the judgments obtained are provable"'3 and apparently conclusive
against the estate19 and are discharged by the approval of the plan.""9 The trustee
or the debtor in possession may be sued for acts of their administration within the
limits of Section 66 of the Judicial Code.' 98 Federal jurisdiction and venue follow
the principles discussed above in connection with railroad reorganization. 91
Approval... and confirmation"' of the plan follow a procedure analogous to that
in railroad reorganization with the exception that the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is the administrative agency to be consulted °
D. Arrangements under Chapter XI
Arrangement proceedings are the offspring of the old compositions and extensions
which have a long and involved history in Anglo-American law3 °1 They are designed
to rehabilitate small and middle-sized businesses.202 Large corporations with securi-
ties held by the public at large are normally not entitled to resort to the summary
procedure of this chapter, 03 which leads 6nly to an extension or scaling-down of
unsecured debtsY0 4
The procedure is initiated by voluntary petition outside of or during bank-
ruptcy.2 5 Upon the filing of the petition the arrangement court acquires exclusive
jurisdiction of the debtor and his property, wherever located, except where incon-
sistent with the other provisions of the Act.0 6 It has been held that the jurisdiction
thus acquired extends to property subject to security interests, although they are not
affected by the plan.20 In addition it is expressly provided that the court may stay
any act or the commencement or continuation of any proceeding to enforce any
lien upon the property of the debtor, upon notice and for cause shown. 20  The
court may further enjoin or stay the commencement or continuation of other
suits,209 which is important if such suit might, for instance, result in the loss by the
debtor of his major source of payment21
If the plan effects a mere extension, all existing unsecured claims are provable,"'1
but if a settlement or satisfaction is sought the ordinary bankruptcy rules of provabil-
I" See Bankruptcy Act, §S96 in conjunction with S1o6(4).
2*, Contra, 6 CoLmEs, BANHmUGpCY 59.06. But see the discussion supra, notes z63 and z64 and
text.
1 Bankruptcy Act, §§224(5), 228(l).
... The debtor in possession has been held to come within the purview of S66. See 6 COLLIER, BANK-
RtUPTY, §§3.3o[2], 8.a6.
"'
5 See supra, notes 176-179 and text. "" Bankruptcy Act, 55174, 216 fl."
.." Id., §221 fl. 200 ld., 5§72.
-"'See Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 Mitr. L. REv. 401 (1947).
1ots. E. C. v. U. S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, 450 (1940). For an excellent
clinical analysis of arrangements under Chapter XI, see Comment, 51 YALE L. J. 253 (1942).
202 Ibid. 
' Bankruptcy Act, §5356, 371.
... Id., S§321, 322. 298 Ia., §311.
"'Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., sx6 F.2d 658 (C. C. A. ad 1940).
2oS Bankruptcy Act, S314 (second clause). "' Id., 5314 (first clause).
9LO Application of Reich, 146 F.ad 16z (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
"'Bankruptcy Act, S307.
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ity apply.212 If the plan is accepted by the requisite majority and confirmed by the
court,213 it is binding upon all creditors21 4 and constitutes a discharge of all dis-
chargeable debts provided for in the arrangement. 5 The court retains jurisdiction
if the arrangement so provides until its provisions are performed21 If the debtor
defaults he may be adjudicated a bankrupt or the suspended bankruptcy proceedings
continued.2 :7 The status in this bankruptcy of claims which have arisen after the
confirmation has created grave doubts.2 18
E. Agricultural Compositions and Extensions under Section 75
The Bankruptcy Act incorporates special provisions for the relief of farmers un-
able to meet their debts as they mature and desiring to effect a composition or an
extension of time2 1 The applicability of the section was limited for a definite
period and the petitions under the section had to be filed prior to March 31, 1947.220
The proceedings consisted, if necessary, of two stages, viz., the attempt to obtain a
workable rehabilitation arrangement 221 and, in case of failure, an adjudication as
bankrupt with a particular statutory right to rehabilitate himself.22 The provisions
of the act caused a number of doubts and uncertainties, 2 3 but since only a relatively
small number of cases are still to be processed 224 no discussion in this study seems
to be in order.
F. Wage Earners' Plans under Chapter XIII
2 s
The provisions of this chapter permit an individual who is a "wage earner, 226
whether in bankruptcy227 or not,228 to file a petition in the appropriate bankruptcy
S1 id., S352; see 8 COLtLIER, BANRUPTCY S7.05 (14th ed., Stcphenson-Scligson, 194!). Because
of the fact that bankruptcy rules of proof and allowance apply, it would seem that judgments obtained
against the debtor after the filing of the petition are not conclusive in the arrangement proceedings.
Bankruptcy Act, S361 ff.
224 Id., S367. Note that the definition of creditors in §307 applies only to mere extension arrange-
ments.
21 'Id., 1371. 21'"Bankruptcy Act, S§368, 357(7).
U"Id., S377.
'"See 8 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1O.'12 ( 4 th ed., Stephenson-Seligson, 194); In re Plymack, 5
Au. B. R. (N.s.) 818 (1941).
21*Bankruptcy Act, S75. For the definition of a "farmer" for the purposes of this section, see
Benitez v. Bank, 313 U. S. 270 (1941).
"Id., §75(c), as amended by Act of June 3, 1946, c. 280, 6o STAT. 230 (1946).
"'Id. §75(a-r). ... Id., §75(s).
"' See Diamond and Letzler, The New Frazier-Lemke Act, 37 COL. L. REv. 1092 (1937); 5 COLLIER,
BANxRPTCY §75.o1 ff. (14th ed., Stephenson-Seligon, 1943).
2"'On June 30, 1946, 1,540 proceedings were pending, with 'only 122 new petitions during the
fiscal year ending on that date. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECroR OF T-E ADmiNis-ATVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 130 (1946). For the proposals of a permanent chapter for farmers,
see Note, 56 YALE L. J. 982 (x947).
"'1For a history of the legislation, see Woodbridge, Wage Earners' Plans in the Federal Courts,
26 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1942).
22"A "wage earner" according to §6o6 (8).is "an individual who works for wages, salary or hire
at a rate of compensation which, when added to all his other income, does not exceed 3ooo a year."
12" Bankruptcy Act, 162i. The bankruptcy proceedings are automatically stayed by the filing of the
petition. Id., S625.
2 id., S622.
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court stating that he is insolvent and desires to effect either a composition or an
extension of time 229 for the payment of his debts 3 0  The jurisdiction of the court
over the debtor, his property wherever located, and his wages or earnings during
the period of consummation of the plan attaches as of the date of filing,23 1 and the
court is given power to stay the commencement or continuation of in personam suits
and on cause shown to enjoin any act or the commencement or continuation of any
proceedings to enforce any lien on the debtor's property. -2 32  The plan is presented
by the debtor and must deal generally with unsecured debts 23and may deal severally
wi--secured debts. 4  Upon appropriate approval by the creditors,235 the court
must confirm the plan if satisfied in certain specified respects23 8 Upon acceptance,
a trustee is appointed for the purpose of receiving the periodic payment of wages
and supervising the execution of the plan. 37 During the period of extension, the
court is given the power necessary to effect the consummation of the plan, 238 and,
upon its completion, the court orders a discharge which is effective as against all
claims which would be dischargeable in straight bankruptcy if the creditor did not
accept the plan (but regardless of whether he participated) *231
Most of the problems which would seem to arise in this chapter are still without
judicial answer. For example, it is provided in Sections 6o and 67 that preferential
transfers and certain judicial liens and fraudulent conveyances are void under
Chapter XIII proceedings. Apparently the debtor himself can set these aside2 40
Furthermore, there is no provision for creditors who acquire claims during the. ex-
tension of the plan, a result which not only tends to defeat the purpose of the act2 41
but also imposes a severe burden of inquiry on prospective creditors. In spite of
difficulties, the chapter has received general acclaim.2 42
2' On the distinction between "compositions" and "extensions" for the purpose of determining
dischargeability under §14(c)(5), see In re Thompson, 51 F. Supp. X2 (W. D. Va. 1943).
"'Bankruptcy Act, §§6o6(6), 623. The petition must be made in good faith. See Hill v. Topeka
Storris Plan Co., 3o5 F.2d 299 (C. C. A. ioth 1939).
"' Id., §§6iI, 612.
Id., 5614.
"Id., §646(1). Other mandatory provisions are set out in Subsections (4) and (5).
"'Id., §646(2).
"'Id., §§633 (3-5), 651, 652.
is d., §656(a).
"Id., §633(4). The trustee under Chapter XIII is merely a custodian. See Woodbridge, supra
note 225, at 784.
.8 Id., §658. This power prevents a garnishment or an assignment of wages during this period.
See Woodbridge, supra note 225, at 792.
""Id., §§66o, 661; 9 COLLmER, BANKRUPTCY §29.10 ( 4 th ed., Stephenson-Seligson, x942).
-,0 Cf. 8 CoLsimE, BANKRUPTCY §6.32 (14th ed., Stephenson-Seligson, 1942); In re Martin Corp.,
ioS F. 2d 372 (C. C. A. 2d 1939).
"' See Bundschu, Adminitration of Wage Earners' Plans in the Bankruptcy Court, z8 J. N. A. REP.
BANKR. 55 (i944).
21 See Woodbridge, supra note 225; Bundschu, supra note 24r; Allgood, Wage Earners' Petitions




The foregoing discussion shows that the Bankruptcy Act supplies a considerable
and difficult portion of the work of the federal courts.243  The statistical data, al-
though excellent, do not indicate the civil suits which are tried by the federal court
as plenary actions, but which either involve the application of the Bankruptcy Act
or at least arise out of bankruptcy.
The problem of jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act presents intricate and
troublesome questions. While a number are intrinsically interwoven with the
substantive bankruptcy law, others are occasioned by the fact that the Federal
Judicial Code and the Bankruptcy Act have not kept step. The proposed revision
of the Judicial Code should clarify the situation and at least prevent unnecessary
litigation on jurisdictional points.
"' For a detailed analysis of all proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1946, see ANHUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECToR OF THE AwmnNIsrRATrVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTs, x8-x89 (1946). The total of petitions filed-io,i96-represents an all-time low. Id.
at 7o. Of these, 122 were under §75, 54 under Chapter X, 79 under Chapter XI, 1,371 under Chapter
XIII and 8,561 under straight bankruptcy. Id., at 130. Of the cases concluded during this fiscal year,
totaling ix,788, 8,473 were no-asset cases. Id., at z5O.
For a chronological comparison of the work of the federal courts in bankruptcy, civil, and criminal
matters as measured by the cases commenced, compare the graphs, id., at 54, 6o, 70.
